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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an endogenous growth model that explains the evolution of the first and
second moments of productivity growth at the aggregate and firm level during the post-war period.
Growth is driven by the development of both (i) idiosyncratic R&D innovations and (ii) general
innovations that can be freely adopted by many firms. Firm-level volatility is affected primarily by
the Schumpeterian dynamics associated with the development of R&D innovations. On the other
hand, the variance of aggregate productivity growth is determined mainly by the arrival rate of
general innovations. Ceteris paribus, the share of resources spent on development of general
innovations increases with the stability of the market share of the industry leader. As market shares
become less persistent, the model predicts an endogenous shift in the allocation of resources from
the development of general innovations to the development of R&D innovations. This results in an
increase in R&D, an increase in firm-level volatility, and a decline in aggregate volatility. The effect
on productivity growth is ambiguous.
On the empirical side, this paper documents an upward trend in the instability of market
shares. It shows that firm volatility is positively associated with R&D spending, and that R&D is
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The literature on endogenous growth has made substantial progress in the past 15 years. In spite
of these advances, however, there remains much to be learnt about the determinants of long-run
productivity growth. In our opinion, the existing literature suﬀers from important limitations.
State-of-the-art models (Aghion and Howitt [1998, Ch. 12], Dinopoulos and Thompson [1998],
Jones [1995], Kortum [1997], Peretto [1998], Segerstrom [1998] and Young [1998]) predict a positive
relationship between the growth rate of productivity and the share of research & development (R&D)
in GDP. However, this prediction does not seem to be true for aggregate data from the post-war
United States (US). Figure 1 illustrates the smoothed growth rate of productivity as well as the
evolution of the share of private R&D in GDP as measured by the National Science Foundation
(NSF). No clear relationship seems to exist between the two variables.1 Comin [2004] also concludes
that R&D expenditures, as deﬁned by the NSF, only give a partial picture of growth. In particular,
he calibrates a general model of innovation and ﬁnds that NSF R&D expenditures can account for
only a small fraction of the average productivity growth in the US during the post-war period.
The lack of relationship between R&D and growth is also present at the sector level. In par-
ticular, Jones and Williams [1998] ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between R&D intensity and TFP
growth at the sector level in the US once sector-level ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced. At the ﬁrm level,
however, Griliches [1980, 1986] and Griliches and Mairesse [1984] have examined the eﬀect of these
same measures of R&D intensity on productivity and TFP growth and have observed a strong
positive association even after including ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects.
This paper builds an endogenous growth model that enhances our understanding of the deter-
minants of productivity growth at the aggregate and ﬁrm level. In particular, the model provides
an explanation for the varying relationship between R&D and productivity growth at diﬀerent ag-
gregation levels described above. Our model builds on the Schumpeterian growth models of Aghion
and Howitt [1992] and Grossman and Helpman [1991, Ch. 4] and introduces a new type of innova-
tions that we denote as general innovations (GIs, henceforth). Like the standard R&D innovations
modelled in Romer [1990] and Aghion and Howitt [1992], general innovations are also non-rival.
However, two important properties diﬀerentiate GIs from R&D innovations. First, a ﬁrm that de-
1Examination of TFP growth or output growth results in similar conclusions. In addition, the upward trend in
R&D also holds for the share of scientists and engineers in employment and for total R&D expenses in the US and in
the OECD. When public R&D expenditures are included into the R&D series, the increase in R&D intensity during
the post-war period prevails, although it is more abrupt.
1velops a general innovation cannot appropriate the beneﬁts other ﬁrms enjoy when they adopt it.
This is the case because general innovations - such as managerial and organizational innovations,
improved process controls, product development, testing practices and pre-production planning,
new personnel and accounting practices, ﬁnancial innovations, the use of electricity as the source
of energy in a plant, etc. - are not embodied in a product and therefore are hard to patent and
relatively easy to reverse-engineer.2,3 A sar e s u l t ,( i )t h ei n v e n t o ro faG Ic a n n o ts e l li tt oo t h e r
ﬁrms and (ii) he only beneﬁts from it because the eﬃciency of production of his ﬁrm improves by
using the new GI.
A second important property of GIs is that, since they provide solutions to problems that aﬀect
ﬁrms in most sectors, their development improves the productivity of many ﬁr m sa c r o s sm a n y
diﬀerent sectors. This contrasts with the productivity improvements associated with new R&D
innovations, which are, for the most part, conﬁned to a speciﬁc sector.
These two properties of GIs have interesting implications. First, a ﬁrm’s incentives to develop
a GI depends on its productivity gain from implementing the innovation. These productivity gains
are larger for more valuable ﬁrms. As a result, general innovations are typically developed by more
valuable, leading ﬁrms.
In equilibrium, there is a negative relationship between resources spent on R&D and resources
spent on the development of general innovations. Since (1) R&D leads to turnover in market leaders
and to a decline in the value of leading ﬁrms and (2) the private return to a GI increases in the
value of the ﬁrm, a force that leads the economy to invest more in R&D (such as a R&D subsidy)
induces a decline in the rate of development of GIs.
This trade oﬀ between R&D and GIs accounts for the trends observed in productivity growth at
the aggregate level. Productivity growth increases with the development of both R&D and general
innovations. Since an increase in R&D intensity leads to a decline in the arrival rate of general
innovations, however, the actual relationship between R&D and productivity growth is ambiguous.
Firm level growth depends on the growth of aggregate demand and, in particular, on the change
in the ﬁrm’s market share. GIs aﬀect all ﬁrms in a relatively symmetric way since they are easier to
2See Table 1 for a longer, albeit incomplete, list of general innovations. For a description of the innovations, see
Appendix 2.
3Hellwig and Irmen [2001] and Boldrin and Levine [2000] have also highlighted the importance of innovations that
are not patentable. The innovations that they model, however, diﬀer from our GIs in that they are embodied and
innovators accrue revenues from the sale of goods that embody the innovation, as is the case in standard endogenous
growth models.
2copy. Therefore, they do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on market shares. R&D investments, instead,
lead ﬁrms to develop new products that replace the current leading products, resulting in signiﬁcant
changes in relative demand and market shares. As a result, ﬁrms that engage more intensively in
R&D investments are more likely to obtain the capital gains associated with becoming the market
leader. This explains the positive association between R&D investments and growth at the ﬁrm
level.
A second limitation of the endogenous growth literature is to ignore the model’s implications
for the second moments of the growth process, as though their determinants were orthogonal to
the ﬁrst moments’ determinants.4 We believe, however, that the model’s predictions for the second
moments of the growth process impose some important restrictions that should be used to test the
growth models. Since both R&D and GIs arrive randomly over time, our model has implications
for the evolution of the volatility of productivity growth at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels.
Two recent strands of the literature have characterized the evolution of volatility at the aggregate
and ﬁrm level. McConnell and Perez-Quiros [1999] and Stock and Watson [2003] have shown that
the volatility of aggregate variables such as output, hours worked and labor productivity growth
has declined during the post-war period. When exploring the evolution of the volatility of these
same variables in publicly traded ﬁrms, Comin and Mulani [2006], Comin and Philippon [2005] and
this paper ﬁnd that it has doubled during the post-war period.
Our model helps understand these opposite trends in ﬁrm and aggregate volatility. R&D inno-
vations lead to substantial ﬁrm-level volatility since incumbents incur losses while entrants enjoy
capital gains. An increase in R&D intensity leads to turnover in the market leader and increases
ﬁrm-level volatility. However, since R&D innovations are to a large extent sector speciﬁc, they have
only a minor eﬀect on aggregate volatility. Aggregate volatility is primarily aﬀected by the arrival
rate of general innovations because these determine the co-movement of growth across sectors by
causing simultaneous ﬂuctuations. Hence, a decline in investments in the development of GIs leads
to a decline in aggregate volatility.
In addition to developing a new model of endogenous growth and volatility, this paper also
provides empirical evidence of the forces and mechanisms emphasized by the model. First, it
documents an increase in the subsidies to R&D innovations over the post-war period. Second, it
4T h e r ee x i s t sl i t e r a t u r et h a th as attempted to explore the eﬀects of exogenous increases in aggregate volatility on
growth (Ramey and Ramey [1995], Barlevy [2003]). A key diﬀerence between that literature and this paper is that
here volatility (both aggregate and ﬁrm-level) is endogenous to analysis.
3shows a very signiﬁcant increase in the market turnover rate during the same period. Third, it
provides evidence that market turnover and ﬁrm volatility have increased by more in sectors where
R&D intensity has increased by more. Fourth, it shows that there has been a substantial decline in
the correlation of productivity growth across sectors, also during the post-war period. As shown by
Comin and Philippon [2005], this decline is responsible for a majority of the decline in aggregate
volatility. Fifth, this paper establishes that R&D is negatively associated with aggregate volatility
by showing that sectors that experienced greater increases in R&D also experienced greater declines
in the correlation between their own growth and the rest of the economy’s. Thus, the increase in
R&D leads to lower aggregate volatility.
While there must be other forces that have contributed to the trends in the volatility of listed
ﬁrms and, specially, in aggregate volatility, the mechanisms emphasized in our model are quanti-
tatively signiﬁcant. A calibration of the model shows that it can account for (1) the lack of an
aggregate relationship between R&D and productivity growth, (2) 75 percent of the increase in the
ﬁrm volatility of listed ﬁrms and, (3) over 40 percent of the decline in aggregate volatility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model and undertakes
the comparative statics exercises. Section 3 discusses and evaluates predictions of the model in both
qualitative and quantitative terms. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
The following describes an endogenous technological change model that delivers endogenous growth
and endogenous volatility at the aggregate and ﬁrm-level. To maximize the clarity of exposition, we
present the basic trade oﬀbetween R&D and general innovations in the context of a one sector model.
We then extend this basic framework to a multisector economy to understand the determinants of
the co-movement of growth across sectors, which is essential for the evolution of aggregate volatility.
2.1 Basic set up
Preferences
The representative consumer enjoys a utility ﬂow that is linear on the units of ﬁnal output






4where r denotes the instantaneous discount rate. Consumers inelastically supply a mass of L units
of labor. They also pay some lump sum of taxes, Tt.
Production
We initially assume the economy is comprised of one sector that competitively produces ys units
of output with price ps. Output is produced by combining m +1intermediate goods, where m
is a constant. Each intermediate good is produced by one and only one producer. Intermediate
goods can be of two types. The good with highest quality, q, is the leading intermediate good.
C o n s u m e r sp e r c e i v et h i sa sad i ﬀerentiated intermediate good because of its superior technical
properties. The rest of the producers cannot compete with the leading intermediate good and must
produce standard, undiﬀerentiated intermediate goods.
Let xl denote the number of units of the leading intermediate good employed to produce output.
Similarly, let x
f
i denote the number of intermediate goods employed from the ith standard producer.
















where q is the quality of the leading intermediate good, β < 1 i st h em a r k e ts h a r eo ft h el e a d i n g
intermediate good, and α ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of substitution between the leading good and the
composite of standard intermediate goods.5
The production of a unit of intermediate good requires a units of labor. a declines with the
eﬃciency of the production process, h, such that
a =1 /h (3)
Innovation
Intermediate good producers can undertake two types of innovations. First, they can attempt
to develop an intermediate good of a quality higher than q. In particular, after spending a share
n
q
i of aggregate output, they face a probability λ
q




1−sR&D over an instantaneous time-interval
dt of developing a new leading good with quality δqq (δq > 1).6 In this formulation, ¯ λ measures
the probability of succeeding in the development of a superior intermediate good per fraction of
output spent on R&D. sR&D denotes a R&D subsidy that is ﬁnanced by the lump sum taxes paid by
5Note that this formulation incorporates an externality from the quality of the leading intermediate good to the
productivity of the standard intermediate goods.
6Griliches [1984] ﬁnds evidence in favor of the linearity of the R&D production technology using ﬁrm-level data.
5consumers. When a standard intermediate good producer succeeds in his R&D eﬀorts, he becomes
the new leading intermediate good producer, and the former market leader becomes a standard
intermediate good producer.7
Second, intermediate goods producers can also invest in improving the production process of
their intermediate good (i.e. reducing the cost of production, a). Speciﬁcally, he can invest a share
nh
i of aggregate output and face an instantaneous probability λ
h




¢ρh , with 0 < ρh < 1,
of successfully increasing h to δhh,w i t hδh > 1. We denote this type of production improvements




ρh as the share
of aggregate output that a producer must invest to face a probability λ of developing a general
innovation.
These two types of innovations diﬀer in their appropiability. Firms that invent a new product
or improve the quality of an existing product can patent the innovation and extract a substantial
fraction of the surplus enjoyed by other ﬁrms from such an innovation. On the other hand, ﬁrms
that develop GIs, such as improvements in management practices, cannot appropriate the beneﬁts
experienced by other ﬁrms that use the innovations. Appropriating this surplus is impossible because
GIs are easy to reverse engineer and because they are diﬃcult to patent, since most of them are
not embodied in a good. These characteristics are reﬂected in the assumption that all producers
immediately (and costlessly) adopt GIs.
A second diﬀerence between the two types of innovations that will be important in the multisector
extension is their applicability. The impact of new or improved goods is often restricted to a small
number of sectors, whereas GIs , such as improvements in management or in the organization of
production mentioned above, can be applied to many diﬀerent economic activities across a wide
array of sectors.
Government
The government collects lump sum taxes from the consumers to ﬁnance the exogenous R&D
subsidy at every instant.
7This formulation of the R&D dynamics has several interesting features. First, the lower demand elasticity of the
leading intermediate good is instrumental in generating cross-sectional variation in sales per worker. Second, by not
having to carry around the distribution of qualities for intermediate goods, we make substantial progress towards
an analytical solution of the model. Third, the absence of entry and exit simpliﬁes the computation of ﬁrm-level
moments.
62.2 Analysis
We start by exploring the pricing problem of intermediate good producers. The leading intermediate
good producer faces an isoelastic demand function and sets a price, pl
x, equal to the marginal cost
times a markup given by the inverse of the elasticity of demand (i.e. 1/α). Bertrand competition
between standard intermediate good producers brings the price of standard intermediate goods,
pf
x, down to their marginal cost of production. These arguments are reﬂected in the following









x = aw (5)














. Expression (6), together with the choice of numeraire,
determines the wage rate.
Plugging the prices into the demand functions, we can solve for the share of each producer’s
































To explore the investment decisions, it proves useful to introduce some notation. Let vl and vf
denote, respectively, the market value of the leading and standard intermediate good ﬁrms, both
divided by nominal output.
8Combining the demands for each intermediate good and the labor market clearing condition, allows us to solve












1+( ( 1− β)α/β)1/(1−α)¤
L
m
7Producers of standard intermediate goods can try to develop a new leading intermediate good
by undertaking R&D investments. The share of output invested by standard intermediate good









The left-hand side in (Lq) is the private cost of investing one percent of output in R&D, whereas
t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei st h ee x p e c t e dm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁtf r o ms u c ha ni n v e s t m e n t .W i t hp r o b a b i l i t y¯ λ
the follower experiences a capital gain given by the diﬀerence between the value of succeeding in
developing a new leading good, δqvl, and the value of a follower in the absence of such an innovation,
vf.
As shown in Appendix 1, the optimal pricing and R&D investment decisions of standard interme-
diate good producers imply that, in the symmetric equilibrium, the value of standard intermediate
goods ﬁrms, vf, is zero. Intuitively, since they charge a price equal to the marginal cost of pro-
duction, they incur losses equal to the cost of undertaking innovations. The linearity in the R&D
technology implies that the losses from the R&D investments are exactly compensated by the ex-
pected capital gains from becoming market leaders, making the net value of a standard intermediate
good producer zero.
The current market leader can also invest in R&D innovations. He faces the same marginal cost
of innovation as followers, but the expected marginal beneﬁti s¯ λ(δq − 1)vl instead of ¯ λδqvl. Since
vl >v f =0 , equation (Lq) implies that the expected marginal beneﬁto fR & Di n n o v a t i o n sf o rt h e
leader is lower than the marginal cost of conducting these innovations. As a result, the market
leader does not conduct R&D innovations in equilibrium.9
The market leader does, however, have incentives to develop general innovations that reduce
the marginal cost of producing intermediate goods for all producers. In an interior solution, the










9This result is standard in Schumpeterian models. In this case, it simpliﬁes the algebra since it implies that
there are two endogenous variables instead of three. It is important to emphasize, however, that this result is not
critical for the implications of the model in any way. Put diﬀerently, had we altered the setting so that leaders also
conducted R&D innovations in equilibrium, it would be simple to characterize situations where all the results from
our analysis continue to hold.
8The left-hand side of (Lh) is the cost of increasing the probability of developing a general
innovation by one percent, whereas the right-hand side is the market leader’s private beneﬁtf r o m
t h ea r r i v a lo faG I .T h i si sg i v e nb yt h em a r k e tv a l u eo ft h el e a d e rt i m e st h eg a i ni np r o d u c t i v i t y
from the arrival of the GI, δh − 1. Note that, since GIs cannot be sold, their private return is
proportional to the value of the ﬁrm that develops them.10 Followers, in principle, can also come
out with general improvements in productivity. In equilibrium, however, since the private value of
these innovations is proportional to the value of the ﬁrm, and vf is equal to zero, followers do not
undertake general innovations.11
To close the model, we just need to determine the value of the market leader, vl, which is given
by the following asset equation:
rv






Equation (9) says that the expected income generated by a license on the leading product
during a unit interval, rvl, is equal to the instantaneous proﬁt ﬂow net of the costs of investing in
GI, (1−α)κl−c(λh), plus the expected capital gain from succeeding in developing a GI, λ
h(δh−1)vl,
minus the expected capital loss from being replaced as market leader by a standard intermediate
good producer, λ
qvl.
Solving for vl yields the following expression:
v
l =






where the numerator reﬂects the proﬁt ﬂow and the denominator reﬂects the time preference, r,
t h ec r e a t i v ed e s t r u c t i o ne ﬀect, λ
q, and the expected gains from the development of GIs, λ
h(δh −1).
The optimal investments in R&D (i.e. equation Lq) and general innovations (i.e. equation Lh)
govern the dynamics of the economy. Note in particular that, since there is no state variable, the
economy converges immediately to the new equilibrium (λ
h, λ
q) following any perturbation in a
parameter.
We are interested in exploring the comparative statics of the investment intensities in R&D and
GIs with respect to the R&D subsidy (sR&D)a n dt h ee ﬃciency of R&D investments (¯ λ). To this
end, we isolate vl from condition (Lq) and obtain that vl =( 1− sR&D)/(¯ λδq). Plugging this back





(1 − sR&D)(δh − 1)
¯ λδq
. (11)
10This result parallels the logic of the span of control model in Lucas [1978].
11Table 1 and Appendix 2 provide evidence that GIs are developed mostly by market leaders.
9The convexity of c(.) implies that the arrival rate of GIs, λ
h, decreases with sR&D and with ¯ λ.
Intuitively, increases in sR&D and ¯ λ reduce the marginal private cost of developing an embodied
innovation. Restoring the equilibrium in the arbitrage condition requires a decline in the value of the
market leader. This decline in vl reduces the marginal private return from investing in developing
GIs. As a result, the arrival rate of GIs (λ
h) declines.
To explore the response of λ
q to increases in sR&D and ¯ λ, we substitute the expression for vl in
the arbitrage equation (Lq) as follows:
(1 − sR&D)=¯ λδq






Increases in sR&D and ¯ λ require a decline in vl to restore the arbitrage condition. The Envelope
Theorem implies that ∂vl/∂λ
h =0 . Therefore, an increase in λ
q is the only way to bring down vl
and restore the arbitrage condition.
The arrival rate of R&D innovations, λ
q, depends both on the exogenous parameters sR&D and
¯ λ a n do nt h es h a r eo fo u t p u tp r i v a t ea g e n t ss p e n do nR & D ,nq. To determine whether increases in















Increases in sR&D or ¯ λ increase the productivity per share of sectoral output spent on R&D
today, but also increase the productivity of the followers that will try to take over tomorrow’s
leader. These two forces are the same; the only diﬀerence between them is the timing. The new
market leader beneﬁts from the higher productivity of R&D expenses earlier than the producers
that will take over in the future. Therefore, as long as the eﬀective discount rate net of the turnover
rate (i.e. r−λ
h(δh−1)) is positive, the ﬁrst force dominates and the share of private R&D expenses
in GDP, nq, increases with sR&D and ¯ λ. We deﬁne this parametrization as Condition 1.
Condition 1: r>λ
h(δh − 1), where λ
h is deﬁned in (11).
Proposition 1 summarizes our ﬁndings thus far.
Proposition 1 In response to increases in sR&D or ¯ λ, the arrival rate of general innovations, λ
h,
declines while the arrival rate of R&D innovations, λ
q, increases. Further, if Condition 1 holds, the
share of GDP spent on private R&D, nq, also increases.
10It follows from Proposition 1 that sR&D and ¯ λ cause the rate of R&D-driven and general innova-
tions to move in opposite directions. This negative co-movement between R&D-driven and general
innovations is one of the two key elements driving the post-war dynamics of growth and volatility at
the aggregate and ﬁrm level. To introduce the second key element, we need to extend the analysis
into a multisector setting.
2.3 Multisector economy
To move from the one-sector to the multisector economy, we need to determine how sectoral output
is aggregated and the applicability of innovations across sectors.
The multisector economy is composed of N sectors. As above, sectoral output, ys, is produced
according to (2). Final output, y, results from competitively aggregating the N sectoral outputs in







In terms of the innovations’ applicability across sectors, we assume that R&D innovations are
sector-speciﬁcw h i l e ,f o rt h et i m eb e i n g ,g e n e r a li n n o v a t i o n sd i ﬀuse freely and immediately to all
the sectors in the economy. This diﬀerence in the innovation’s applicability is founded on both a
priori knowledge and empirical evidence. Innovations in management, sales, personnel, distribution
and similar ﬁelds can be applied to virtually all sectors of the economy because ﬁrms in all sectors
need to manage, sell, motivate and coordinate workers and distribute their products and services.
Hence, the generality of GIs. In contrast, R&D innovations eventually lead to the creation or
improvement of a product that increases the productivity of a sector-speciﬁct a s k . T h u s ,R & D
innovations are mostly sector-speciﬁc. In the empirical section, we explore the generality of GIs
and R&D innovations by estimating the eﬀect of R&D on the correlation of growth across sectors.
The evidence presented there supports the greater generality of GIs over R&D innovations.
The generality of GIs implies that the development of a new GI leads both sectoral and aggregate
output to increase by a factor of δh. The sector speciﬁcity of R&D innovations implies that the
development of a R&D innovation in sector s leads to an increase in ys by a factor δq, but leads to
an increase in aggregate output by only a factor of δ
1/N
q .
We denote the arrival rate of R&D innovations in sector s by λ
q
s. λ
h continues to denote the
12The Cobb-Douglas nature of the aggregate production function implies that the nominal output of each sector
represents a 1/N share of GDP, regardless of the number of R&D and GIs developed in the sector.
11arrival rate of GIs in the economy. Following the same logic as in the one-sector version, we can
derive arbitrage and optimal investment in GIs equations very similar to (Lq) and (Lh).13 For the
sake of brevity, we relegate the details of the derivations to Appendix 1. We can also use an asset
equation similar to (9) to determine the market value of the producer of the leading intermediate
good in any given sector as
v
l =






q − 1)(N − 1)) − λ
h(δh − 1)
(15)
This expression diﬀers from the value of the leader in the one-sector economy in two important
aspects. First, now GIs are also developed in other sectors. Therefore, the leader in sector s incurs
only in the cost of developing a fraction 1/N of the GIs developed in the economy, but beneﬁts
from an arrival rate of λ
h. Second, now the leader in sector s beneﬁts from the increase in aggregate
demand associated with the development of R&D innovations in the other sectors. This reduces




q − 1)(N − 1)).
As before, the arbitrage and optimal investment in GIs equations together with the expression
for vl, govern the dynamics of the economy. Given the similarity to the one-sector model, it is not
surprising that we can specify conditions such that sR&D and ¯ λ cause λ
q
s and λ
h to move in opposite
directions. For brevity’s sake, these conditions are speciﬁed in Appendix 1, and are assumed to
hold henceforth. As before, λ
h declines with sR&D and ¯ λ. The important diﬀerence with respect
to the one sector economy is that, since some GIs are developed in other sectors, ∂vl/∂λ
h > 0 at
the optimum. In this context, it could be the case that, in response to increases in sR&D or ¯ λ, the
decline in λ
h is large enough to necessitate a decline (rather than an increase) in λ
q
s to equalize
the marginal cost with the expected marginal beneﬁtf r o mR & Di n n o v a t i o n s. We regard this as a
pathological case and impose conditions, stated in Appendix 1, that rule it out.
Next, we compute the ﬁrst and second moments of the growth rates of output and productivity
at the aggregate and ﬁrm level and explore their evolution in response to increases in sR&D and ¯ λ.
Aggregate moments
Growth is the result of both embodied and general innovations. For any given sector s, the
growth rate of the sector’s output (or productivity), γys, is equal to the number of embodied
13The only diﬀerence that the multisector context introduces in the R&D arbitrage condition is that, because of
the sectoral speciﬁcity of R&D innovations, the capital gain from the development of a R&D innovation now becomes
δ
1/N
q vl, instead of δqvl.
12innovations in the sector times the log of their eﬀect on sectoral output, plus the number of general
innovations developed in the entire economy times their eﬀect on sectoral output. Formally,
γys = γy/ls =# qs ∗ ln(δq)+# h ∗ ln(δh),
where #qs is the number of new embodied innovations developed in the sector during the period,
and #h is the number of new general innovations developed in the economy.
The growth rate of the economy, γy, is the average of the sectoral growth rates:








∗ ln(δq)+# h ∗ ln(δh).
Given the Poisson arrival rates of new technologies, the average growth rate and average variance
























Several conclusions can be drawn from these expressions. (i) Aggregation does not aﬀect the
expected growth rate of productivity since aggregate and sectoral expected growth rates (expressions
17 and 16, respectively) coincide. (ii) Increases in sR&D or ¯ λ have ambiguous eﬀects on expected
growth. In particular, these parameter changes lead to increases in λ
q
s and declines in λ
h and hence
to an ambiguous eﬀect on the average growth rate of productivity both at the aggregate and sector
levels. (iii) The variance of sectoral growth (expression 18) also responds ambiguously to increases
in sR&D and ¯ λ. (iv) However, this ambiguity disappears when we explore their eﬀect on the variance
of aggregate growth (expression 19). R&D-driven innovations are sector speciﬁca n da r ea v e r a g e d
away at the aggregate level. Hence, their eﬀect on aggregate volatility is smaller than on sectoral
volatility. General innovations, on the other hand, are adopted across the economy. Thus, their
impacts are the same at the aggregate and sectoral level. As a result, , for N suﬃciently large,
the decline in aggregate volatility driven by the decline in λ
h dominates the increase in volatility
associated with the higher λ
q
s, and aggregate volatility declines in response to increases in sR&D
and ¯ λ. (v) Hence, aggregation does aﬀect the second moments of the growth rate of productivity,
(expressions 18 and 19).
13Firm-level moments
Expected ﬁrm-level sales growth − denoted by Eγsalesi− is aﬀected by the rates of arrival of
general innovations and R&D innovations in the economy through their eﬀects on aggregate growth,
Eγy. In addition, producers of standard intermediate goods expect a higher growth rate of sales
than market leaders because they invest in R&D, and with probability λ
q
s/m, they will take over
the market leader and his sales. Conversely, the current market leader does not invest in R&D and
with probability λ
q
s will be taken over by a follower, experiencing a loss in sales. As can be observed
below, the distribution of the expected growth rate of sales per worker − denoted by Eγsalesi/Li−
only diﬀers from the distribution of the growth rate of sales in the size of the capital gain/loss from
market turnover. Hence, at the ﬁrm level, the model predicts a positive relationship between R&D
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The ﬁrm-level volatility of the growth rates of sales and sales per worker depends on the vari-
ance of the aggregate growth rate of the economy and the risk of turnover in the market leader.
























The variance of aggregate output in the US data is approximately two orders of magnitude
smaller than the variance of ﬁrm-level volatility. Hence, the quantitatively important term is the
latter, which is driven by the turnover rate, λ
q
s.A ni n c r e a s ei nsR&D or ¯ λ leads to higher turnover, λ
q
s,
both directly and through the increased investments in the development of R&D-driven innovations
that it triggers. In this way, sR&D and ¯ λ increase ﬁrm-level volatility.
14Firm-level variances are weighted by the share of ﬁrm sales.
143 Discussion and Evidence
We have just shown that the model predictions are consistent with the facts described in the
introduction. It predicts the lack of a clear relationship between R&D intensity and productivity
growth at the aggregate level, the positive association between them at the ﬁrm level, the upward
trend in ﬁrm-level volatility and the downward trend in aggregate volatility. In this section, we do
three things. First, we describe the increase in R&D subsidies during the post-war period. Second,
we discuss further theoretical predictions of the model and bring them to the data in order to
further check for the empirical relevance of the mechanisms described in the model. Third, we
conduct calibration exercises to assess the power of the model to generate the dynamics of volatility
and growth observed in the data.
3.1 Driving forces
The R&D tax policy in the United States has been implemented through three main initiatives
(Hall [1995]). The expensing rules forR & D ,i n t r o d u c e di n1 9 5 4 ,a l l o w e dU Sﬁrms to expense most
R&D expenditures against corporate income for tax purposes. The Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 allowed US ﬁrms to allocate all R&D expenses against income earned within the United
States, even if a substantial part of their revenue was generated from foreign sales. In addition, the
act introduced the Federal R&D tax credit which allowed ﬁrms to deduct from corporate income
taxes, in proportion to the established credit rate, a portion of qualiﬁed R&D expenditures that
exceeded a certain level.
State-level R&D tax credits followed soon after when, in 1982, Minnesota became the ﬁrst state
to introduce such a credit. Since then the number of states oﬀering a R&D tax credit has steadily
increased, and 31 states currently oﬀer some form of a tax credit on general, company funded R&D.
Not only has the number of states oﬀering a tax credit increased, but the average value of these
credits has also grown. Wilson [2005] calculated the eﬀective value of all state-level credits for
every year since their inception, taking into account the statutory credit rate, the base amount and
whether the credit itself was taxable. He found that the eﬀective average value of the state-level
tax credits has grown approximately four-fold since their inception in 1982. Hall and Wosinka
[1999] examined the beneﬁt of these federal and state tax credits for US ﬁrms. They calibrated the
eﬀective R&D subsidy to range between .4 and .6 depending on whether the ﬁrm is subject to state
taxation and whether it is eligible for the tax credits.
15The increasing level of R&D subsidies leads, in our speciﬁcation of the R&D technology, to an
increasing turnover rate. In addition to the direct eﬀect, R&D subsidies also induce higher private
R&D expenses, according to Proposition 1. There is a literature devoted to test this prediction,
which concludes that R&D tax credits have lead to a substantial increase in the share of private
R&D in GDP both in the US (Hall [1993], Mamuneas and Nadiri [1996]) and in other OECD
countries (Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen [2002]).
It is important to emphasize that R&D subsidies apply only to R&D expenses. According to the
NSF, “R&D consists of activities carried on by persons trained, either formally or by experience, in
the physical sciences such as chemistry and physics, the biological sciences such as medicine, and
engineering and computer science. R&D includes these activities if the purpose is to do one or more
of the following things:
1. Pursue a planned search for new knowledge [...]. (Basic research)
2. Apply existing knowledge to problems involved in the creation of a new product or process
[...]. (Applied research)
3. Apply existing knowledge to problems involved in the improvement of a present product or
process. (Development).”15
The NSF also presents a list of activities closely related to our GIs, which are explicitly excluded
from the deﬁnition of R&D. Among these we ﬁnd social science expenditures, deﬁned as those
“devoted to further understanding [of] the behavior of groups of human beings or of individuals as
members of groups [in the following areas]: personnel, economics, artiﬁcial intelligence and expert
systems, consumer, market and opinion, engineering psychology, management and organization,
actuarial and demographic...”
Therefore, investments in developing general innovations (by-and-large) do not beneﬁtf r o m
R&D subsidies.16,17
15Process innovation refers to the development of new industrial processes such as those that lead to the production
of steel or chemical products. In our context, this is the same as standard R&D that leads to a new product or an
improved version of an existing product.
16Rationalizing R&D subsidies goes beyond the scope of this paper. Though R&D has some positive externalities,
political considerations may also be involved. Congress, for example, has repeatedly failed to renew the Federal R&D
tax credit for longer than one or two years. One rationale for this is that keeping the credit temporary can be used
as a carrot for business, and it encourages corporations to make ﬁnancial contributions to their representatives every
year in order to preserve this feature of the tax law (New York Times, October 28, 1998).
17Though harder to quantify, the growing trend of outsourcing services or the production of certain components
has made it easier for followers to ﬁgure out how to improve the products and services provided by market leaders.
163.2 Productivity growth
Our model predicts an ambiguous eﬀect of R&D on productivity growth at the aggregate and sector
level. On the one hand, R&D has a positive eﬀect on the development of patentable R&D innova-
tions while on the other, it has a negative eﬀect on the number of GIs developed in the economy.
Abdih and Joutz [2005] provide details about the relationship between R&D and growth. They
estimate cointegration relationships between R&D labor, patent applications (i.e. R&D output),
and TFP. They ﬁnd that, while there is a strong and signiﬁcant positive relationship between R&D
labor and patent applications, there is no statistical relationship between patents and TFP. That
is, R&D investments produce patents but patent growth fails to have an eﬀect on TFP growth.
The lack of a relationship persists after allowing for diﬀerent leads and lags. These results support
the view presented by our model, as Abdih and Joutz [2005] recognize. In particular, their ﬁndings
constitute indirect evidence in favor of the joint hypothesis that GIs are an important source of
productivity growth and that R&D dampens the development of GIs.
We are not the ﬁrst ones to highlight the importance of general innovations for productivity
growth. After studying the importance of the innovations introduced during the last century in
the US, Mokyr [2002] claims that “much of the productivity increase in the twentieth century
was the result of the perfection of production techniques and process innovation. [...] These led
to a continuous transformation in organizational methods, most obviously in mass production in
manufacturing techniques but eventually in services and agriculture as well.”
Unfortunately, direct measures on the intensity of investment in general innovations are not
available. This makes it diﬃcult to directly test the negative eﬀe c to fR & Do nt h ed e v e l o p m e n t
of general innovations. One imperfect substitute to this exercise consists of creating a list of GIs
and noting that most of them were introduced either before World War II or between the 50’s and
early 60’s when ﬁrm turnover was low. Table 1 provides our (very incomplete) list of GIs, most
of which were developed before 1970 by large ﬁrms that dominated their markets.18 Below, we
conduct a more systematic test of the negative eﬀect of R&D on GIs investments based on the
sectoral variation in second moments.
This diﬀusion of knowledge beyond the boundaries of market leaders has increased the productivity of private R&D
expenses, ¯ λ. These changes in the ﬂow of knowledge are unlikely to have a signiﬁcant impact on the productivity of
investments in developing GIs. This is the case because those that now more easily acquire knowledge are followers,
and followers develop a small share of all the general innovations developed in the economy.
18A brief description of each technology and why it qualiﬁes as a general innovation is relegated to Appendix 2.
173.3 Firm volatility19
As described in section 2, our model rationalizes the increase in ﬁrm-volatility observed by Comin
and Mulani [2006] and Comin and Philippon [2005] in the COMPUSTAT sample. Figure 2 illustrates
the time series of the volatility of productivity growth at the aggregate and ﬁrm level. The left axis
plots the standard deviation of 10-year centered rolling windows of annual productivity growth.
The right axis plots the evolution of the same variable averaged for ﬁrms in the COMPUSTAT data
base.20 The opposing trends are evident.
It is worth making two remarks about the increase in the volatility of publicly traded ﬁrms.
First, as shown in Comin and Mulani [2006], the increase in ﬁrm volatility in the COMPUSTAT
sample is qualitatively and quantitatively robust to conditioning on a ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀect, the age
of the ﬁrm and the size of the ﬁrm. To further control for the possibility that the upward trend in
ﬁrm volatility is driven by a change in the composition of the COMPUSTAT sample, we estimate
the following speciﬁcation for the standard deviation of the growth rate of sales and sales per worker
in the ﬁrm i over a ten year window (σit).







In this speﬁcation we denote by ageit and salesit the age and real sales of ﬁrm i in year t. Dic
is cohort ﬁxed eﬀect which takes a value of 1 for the ﬁrms of cohort c and 0 for the rest. Dτt is a
year ﬁxed eﬀe c tw h i c ht a k e sav a l u eo f1i fτ = t and zero otherwise. To compute the equivalent of
a weighted measure of residual ﬁrm volatility we weight observations by the share of real sales in
total sales. Figure 3 reports the evolution of the estimates of βτ for the volatility of the growth rate
of real sales and real sales per worker. It is quite evident from this ﬁgure that the upward trends
in ﬁrm volatility persist after including the cohort eﬀects.21 H e n c e ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nﬁrm volatility is
not driven by a change in the composition of ﬁrms in the COMPUSTAT sample.
In our model, the increase in ﬁrm volatility is driven by an increase in the turnover of market
19Consistent with the data, the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrm sizes, measured by employment or by relative
sales, in the model is constant over time. However, we are more interested in the statistics of growth rates rather
than levels.
20For each ﬁrm in COMPUSTAT, we compute its volatility in a given year as the centered standard deviation of
10 consecutive annual growth rates of sales per worker. The ﬁrm volatility measure plotted in Figure 2 is the average
volatility across ﬁrms.
21The upward trends are completely robust to including cohort-speciﬁc age and size eﬀects in the regression.
18leaders, λ
q
s. Comin and Philippon [2005] show that various measures of the turnover rate have
increased very signiﬁcantly.22 Figure 4, for example, plots a measure of the inverse of the turnover
rate for the sample of ﬁrms in the COMPUSTAT database. Speciﬁcally, for each two digit sector
and year, ﬁrms are ranked by the level of sales per worker. After creating a vector of percentiles for
every year in the post-war period, persistence in rankings is measured by computing the correlation
between the vectors of rankings in two years, ﬁve and ten years apart (i.e. 1950 with 1955 and 1950
with 1960). Repeating the same exercise for all the years in the post-war period results in a time
series for the turnover in market leadership.23
Both of these statistics indicate that there has been an increase in market turnover. In the
early 50s, the correlation of rankings was 0.9 for the 5-year-apart measure and 0.8 for the 10-year-
apart measure. These correlations have declined in a fairly monotonic manner reaching 0.71 and
0.66, respectively, at the end of the sample in 2002. These numbers can be used to compute,
approximately, the turnover rates in our model, λ
q
s.24 In the mid 50’s, λ
q
s was approximately two
percent while, in the mid 90s, it was 2.5 to 3 times higher. Comin and Philippon [2005] conduct
similar exercises using other measures of market leadership, such as proﬁt rates and market value.
Speciﬁcally, they compute the probability that a ﬁrm currently ranked in the top 20th percentile
of its sector by proﬁt rates or market value is not in the top 20th percentile in ﬁve years. These
exercises imply that the turnover rate has increased by a factor of ﬁve or six during the post-war
period.
These estimates of λ
q
s can be used to calibrate the ability of the model to account for the upward
trend in ﬁrm volatility. Recall that the variance of the growth rates of sales and sales per worker


























In the US, var(γy) is approximately two orders of magnitude smaller than the variance of ﬁrm-
22In particular, Comin and Philippon [2005] document a ﬁve-fold increase in the probability that a ﬁrm currently
in the top ﬁfth of proﬁts or market capitalization in the sector drops from the top ﬁfth in the next ﬁve years.
23This measure of turnover is unlikely to be aﬀected by entry into the COMPUSTAT sample. This is the case
because when there are more ﬁrms in sample, it is more likely that a ﬁrm is taken over by some other ﬁrm, but the
decline in the percentile associated with this decline in the ranking will be smaller if there were fewer ﬁrms in sample.
24See Appendix 3 for the formal derivation.
19level growth and hence irrelevant to the evolution of ﬁrm-level volatility. Our previous estimates
imply that the turnover rate in COMPUSTAT in 1950, λ
q
s1950, was approximately two percent. We
can then calibrate the terms in square brackets in (22) and (23) to match the initial ﬁrm volatility in
COMPUSTAT.25 Based on the direct estimates in Comin and Philippon [2005] and on the evolution
of the private R&D intensity in the US, the turnover rate at the end of the sample, λ
q
s2000, is at
least between 2.5 and 3 times larger than the initial turnover rate.26 Therefore, the model predicts
an increase in ﬁrm-level variance by at least a factor of 2.5 or 3. Since in the data, ﬁrm variance
has increased by a factor of approximately four in the post-war period, the model can explain at
least 62 to 75 percent of the increase in the variance of ﬁrm-level growth.
Cross-sectional variation in relationship between R&D and ﬁrm volatility
In addition to having implications for the evolution of ﬁrm-volatility, our model has testable
predictions about the cross-sectoral relationship between R&D and ﬁrm volatility. In our model,
variation in R&D intensity comes from variation in either sR&D or ¯ λ. Our analysis above implies
that in sectors where R&D intensity has increased more (i.e. because sR&D or ¯ λ have increased by
more), we should observe larger increases in ﬁrm volatility and in the turnover rate. In addition,
in other countries where R&D has increased, we should observe a similar increase in ﬁrm volatility.
As we shall see next, the data supports these predictions.
Comin and Philippon [2005] build a panel of annual R&D intensities, turnover rates and average
ﬁrm volatility in 35 two-digit sectors that cover the US economy from 1950 until 1996. For each
sector, they compute the ratio of R&D expenses to total sales, the median and average standard
deviation of a 10-year rolling window of growth in sales and sales per worker, and the persistence
in the rankings of sales per worker as in Figure 4. Then they estimate the following regressions:
λ
q
it = α0i + α1t + β ∗ (R&D/Sales)it + ²it
σit = α0i + α1t + β ∗ (R&D/Sales)it + ²it
These speciﬁcations include both a sector-level ﬁxed eﬀe c ta n dat i m et r e n dt or e d u c et h e
possibility of spurious correlations between R&D and volatility. In all the cases, they ﬁnd a positive
25This implies that the sales and sales per worker of market leaders are approximately 70 percent higher than sales
and sales per worker of market followers.
26Private R&D intensity in the US has increased by a factor of three. In addition, R&D subsidies have increased
and the eﬃciency of R&D expenses has increased. The linearity of the production function for R&D innovations
implies that the turnover rate must have increased by, at least, a factor of three.
20and statistically signiﬁcant association between R&D and ﬁrm volatility and between R&D and
turnover. These estimates are robust to substituting the time trend for time dummies and to
controlling for other forces, such as the development of ﬁnancial markets, that may contribute to
ﬁrm volatility. Furthermore, the estimated coeﬃcient is economically signiﬁcant. The increase in
R&D intensity accounts for 60 percent of the increase in ﬁrm volatility.
The mechanisms described in our model may also explain the volatility dynamics in other coun-
tries. Parker [2006] and Thesmar and Thoenig [2004] have found similar upward trends in the
volatility of publicly-traded companies in the UK and France. Interestingly, the periods studied by
these authors are periods where, as in the US, there was (i) an important increase in R&D subsidies,
(ii) an important increase in private R&D intensity and (iii) a decline in aggregate volatility.
Evolution of ﬁrm volatility in privately-held ﬁrms
In empirical evaluation of the model’s predictions for ﬁrm-level volatility, we have restricted our
attention to the sample of publicly traded ﬁrms. One reason for this is the scarcity of data on
privately held ﬁrms. A more substantive reason is that the R&D-driven Schumpeterian dynamics
that drive ﬁrm volatility in our model, most likely, are only relevant for publicly traded ﬁrms. This
is the case because R&D expenses of publicly traded ﬁrms represent 95 percent of total private R&D
expenses in the US. Non-publicly traded ﬁrms represent between 40 and 50 percent of aggregate
value added, but conduct a very small part of total R&D.27 As a result, one would expect that the
increased market turnover associated with the increase in R&D expenses would not be a signiﬁcant
factor in explaining the ﬁrm volatility of privately held ﬁrms.
Davis et al. [2006] have recently analyzed the evolution of employment volatility for US privately
held ﬁrms since late 1970s. They ﬁnd that the volatility of non-publicly traded ﬁrms has declined
during this time. It is obvious that our model does not explain the evolution of volatility for privately
held ﬁrms. This is the case because (i) the volatility of privately held ﬁr m si sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly
aﬀected by R&D, and because (ii) there are other factors that are relevant to explaining the volatility
27One reason why privately held ﬁrms may not engage in R&D is because their ¯ λ is very low.
21of privately held ﬁrms that are orthogonal to our model.28,29 In this sense, the relevant test of our
theory of ﬁrm volatility is clearly the positive conditional correlation observed above between R&D
and the volatility of publicly held companies.
It is important to note that, even though our model has nothing to say about the evolution of
the volatility of privately held ﬁrms, it has important implications for the evolution of aggregate
volatility. This is the case because the evolution of aggregate volatility in the US is critically
linked to the evolution of the covariance of growth between ﬁrms rather than the evolution of
ﬁrm-level variance. This conclusion follows from two ﬁndings. First, as shown in Comin and
Philippon [2005], a variance covariance decomposition of aggregate volatility illustrates that the
component that explains all the decline in the variance of aggregate growth is the covariance of
growth between sectors rather than the variance of growth within sectors. Second, this holds a
fortiori when disaggregating all the way until reaching the ﬁrm level. Comin and Mulani [2006]
conduct a variance-covariance decomposition of growth in the aggregate sales in COMPUSTAT
and ﬁnd that (i) the covariance of growth between ﬁrms is 10 times larger than the ﬁrm variance
component and (ii) the variance of the COMPUSTAT aggregate is driven entirely by the covariance
of growth between ﬁrms. Following Gabaix [2005], it is natural to hypothesize that, this conclusion
would hold a fortiori if we included privately-held ﬁrms which are signiﬁcantly smaller than publicly
28There are many important diﬀerences between publicly and privately held companies. One very signiﬁant
diﬀerence is size. In 2001, 50 percent of U.S. employees worked for ﬁrms with 500 employees or more. In the
COMPUSTAT sample, instead, over 99 percent of employees worked for ﬁrms with over 500 employees. These
large ﬁrms represented almost 80 percent of all ﬁrms in our COMPUSTAT sample. To explain the decline in the
volatility of privately-held ﬁrms, it is necessary to consider mechanisms that drive down ﬁrm volatility and that are
particularly relevant for privately held ﬁrms. One such force may be the improvement of ﬁnancial markets that now
allow privately-held ﬁrms to better insure their risks. Exploring this or any other hypothesis is beyond the scope of
this paper.
29One possible criticism is that the NSF underestimates the R&D conducted by privately held companies, specially
ﬁrms that are not operating yet because they are in the venture capital stage. Though it is possible that the R&D
series is not perfect, it is unlikely that the bias due to mismeasuring R&D conducted by privately held ﬁrms is
signiﬁcant. According to the National Venture Capital Association, in 1996 venture capital investments represented
$10 Billion. Of course, this is signiﬁcantly higher than the average during the post-war period and only a small
fraction of this was employed in R&D. An upper bound of the R&D share in book equity based on R&D intensive
ﬁrms in COMPUSTAT would be 10 percent. Hence, the unmeasured R&D from venture capital would be less than
$1 Billion. Total private R&D in the US during 1996 was $134 Billion, which makes insigniﬁcant the potential bias
in total private R&D expenditures. Indeed, the BEA does not even include this in the list of measurement biases
encountered in the construction of the Research and Development Satellite Accounts (Okubo et al. [2006]).
22traded.
As we shall show next, our model provides a testable theory for the determinants and evolution
of the covariance of growth in the economy.
3.4 Sectoral co-movement
To gain further insight into the evolution of aggregate volatility in our model economy, we can











where cov(γyn,γyn0) denotes the covariance between the growth rates of two generic sectors n and
n0.
In expression (24), as the number of sectors, N, increases, the importance of the sectoral variance
in aggregate variance declines, and aggregate volatility increasingly depends on the covariance of
growth across sectors. Sectoral variance, V (γys), depends on the arrival rate of embodied innovations
developed in the sector, λ
q
s, and the arrival rate of general innovations developed in the economy, λ
h.
The sectoral covariance, on the other hand, is equal to λ
h(ln(δh))2 and depends solely on the hazard
rate for general innovations. Therefore, as the number of sectors increases, the variance of aggregate
growth increasingly depends on the intensity of general innovations while the arrival rate of R&D-
driven innovations becomes less relevant. Further, increases in sR&D or ¯ λ lead, unambiguously, to
declines in the average covariance of growth across sectors and, if the number of sectors in the
economy is large, they also induce declines in aggregate volatility.
The covariance of sectoral growth can be trivially decomposed into the product of the standard




V (γys)V (γys0) ∗ corr(γys,γys0)
When looking at actual data, the variance of growth in a sector typically depends on factors such
as the sector size and age. To ﬁlter out these eﬀects, it is useful to explore the model implications












23Note that the sectoral correlation is increasing in λ
h and decreasing in λ
q
s. It follows from our
previous analysis that increases in sR&D and ¯ λ lead to declines in the correlation of sectoral growth.
Has the correlation of sectoral growth declined?





t−4) is deﬁned as the correlation between the annual growth rate
in sectors s and j during the 10-year period centered at t. Then, for every sector s,t h ea v e r a g e
















j denotes the average share of sector j0s sale in the total sales of the economy. Finally,











Figures 5 and 6 show a clear downward trend in the average correlation, corra
t,o fp r o d u c t i v i t ya n d
TFP growth across sectors during the post-war period.30 C o m i na n dP h i l i p p o n[ 2 0 0 5 ]s h o wt h a t
the decline in the correlation of sectoral growth is driven by a decline in the covariance of growth
across sectors, as opposed to a decline in the variance of sectoral growth. This evidence provides
further support for our model, which predicts an unambiguous decline in the covariance of growth
across sectors and an ambiguous evolution of the variance of growth at the sector level in response
to increases in sR&D and ¯ λ.
Imperfect diﬀusion of GIs
The basic version of the model predicts no cross-sectional variation in the correlation of growth
between sectors because GIs are adopted immediately in all sectors. Now we enrich the model
by relaxing the assumption that GIs are applicable to all sectors in the economy. Speciﬁcally, we
introduce two new assumptions: (i) the intermediate goods producers of a given sector can freely
adopt all general innovations developed in the sector and (ii) the random variable that determines
whether a general innovation is suitable to be adopted in a sector other than the one in which it
was developed follows a Bernoulli distribution that is independent across sectors and innovations.
Let ψ denote the probability that a general innovation is adopted in a sector other than the
one in which it was developed. The previous assumptions imply that the arrival rate of general
30See Comin and Philippon [2005] for more on this downward trend.






n denotes the rate of development of
GIs in sector n, and λ
h
(−n) denotes the average rate of development of GIs in the sectors other than
n.31 T h ec o v a r i a n c eo fg r o w t hi nt w os e c t o r s ,n and n0, depends on how frequently they adopt the
same GIs. Clearly, the probability of such a coincidence is higher for the technologies developed in
either of the sector than for technologies developed in other sectors. Speciﬁcally, the probability
that a technology developed in n (or n0) is suitable for adoption in n0 (or n) is ψ. The probability
that a technology developed in a sector other than n and n0 is suitable for adoption in n and n0 is
ψ
















−(n,n0) denotes the average rate of development of general innovations in the sectors other
than n and n0. Averaging over all the sectors n0, the average covariance of the growth of sector n














To explore the cross-section variation in this covariance, suppose, for example, that the eﬃciency
of investments in the development of embodied innovations, ¯ λ, varies across sectors. We know that,
in sectors with higher values of ¯ λ,l e a d i n gﬁrms have fewer incentives to develop GIs. Given the
imperfect diﬀusion of GIs, those sectors with a higher ¯ λ adopt fewer GIs and co-vary less with the
rest of the sectors. Hence, there is a negative cross-sectoral relationship between ¯ λ and the average
covariance of a sector. We also know from our previous analysis that there is a positive relationship
between ¯ λ and R&D intensity. Therefore, the model implies a negative cross-sectional relationship
between R&D intensity in a given sector and the average covariance of growth in that sector.















31If GIs do not diﬀuse perfectly across sectors, sectors that develop fewer GIs also implement fewer GIs. As a
result, the model predicts that in sectors with more R&D investments, the contribution to growth from GIs will be
lower. Since R&D investments have a direct positive eﬀect on growth, the resulting relationship between R&D and
growth will be ambiguous. This is consistent with the insigniﬁcant relationship between R&D intensity and TFP
growth found by Jones and Williams [1998] in a panel of sectors.
25where var−n is the average variance across sectors other than n. Given the negative eﬀect of ¯ λ on
covn and the positive eﬀect of ¯ λ on varn, the model implies a negative cross-sectional relationship
between R&D intensity in sector n and the sectoral correlation of growth (expression 29).
This prediction is very important because it allows us to test (albeit indirectly) the negative




s,t = αs + βt + γRDs,t + ²st (30)
where corrsec
s,t is deﬁned in expression (26), and RDs,t denotes the R&D intensity in sector s at time
t.T h eﬁrst and seventh columns in Table 2 report the estimate of γ when corrsec
s,t is measured by
the correlations of productivity and TFP growth, respectively. In both cases, R&D is associated
with a signiﬁcant decline in correlation. Speciﬁcally, the estimates of γ are −3.3 for productivity
and −2.5 for TFP growth, with p − values of two percent. This implies that the increase in R&D
is associated with a decline of between 7.5 and 10 percentage points of the 10 and 25 percentage
point decline observed in the sectoral correlation of TFP or productivity growth. These estimates
are robust to replacing the time trend with year dummies.
Columns 2 and 8 of Table 2 replace R&D intensity with a sector’s ﬁrm-level volatility as the
explanatory variable. Consistent with the model, higher ﬁrm-level volatility in a sector is also
associated with lower correlation of sectoral growth with other sectors.32 This shows that the trends
in ﬁrm and aggregate volatility are not simply a coincidence: A common component can account
for an important part of both trends. This is not the case in current models of ﬁrm heterogeneity33
because the interactions between ﬁrms embedded in these models are not adequate: most of them
are partial equilibrium models and treat ﬁrms as independent entities. Even though more recent
versions of these models have incorporated general equilibrium interactions, they seem insuﬃcient
to generate the co-movement patterns that drive the diverging trends in volatility. In this sense,
our model emphasizes a particular mechanism that introduces strong interactions between ﬁrms
and that has aggregate implications for ﬁrst and second moments of growth.
32These results are robust to restricting the sample to private sectors, using other variables to measure ﬁrm
volatility, using the median instead of the average to measure the ﬁrm volatility in the sector, using a measure of
turnover in the sector as the independent variable instead of a measure of ﬁrm volatility and including a time trend
or no trend at all instead of the year ﬁxed eﬀects.
33For example, Bertola and Caballero [1990] and Gabaix [2005].
26In principle, the estimated eﬀect of R&D on sectoral correlation could be driven by omitted
variable bias. For example, it could be argued that R&D intensity may be related to the sensitivity of
sectors to aggregate shocks. However, to the extent that this sensitivity has not changed signiﬁcantly
over time, this eﬀect should be captured by the sector ﬁxed eﬀe c t .O n ek i n do fa g g r e g a t es h o c kt h a t
has been related to the decline in aggregate volatility is oil price shocks. To test if the omission of
the sensitivity of the sector to oil prices is biasing our estimates of γ towards signiﬁcance, we run
regression (30), controlling for the share of energy in the sector. Columns 3, 4, 9 and 10 show that
including the share of energy in the control set has no eﬀect on the estimates of the eﬀect of R&D
or ﬁrm volatility on sectoral correlation. Further, in columns 5, 6, 11 and 12, we show that these
results hold when we restrict our sample to the sectors other than the energy sector.
Another explanation for the decline in aggregate volatility is proposed by Thesmar and Thoenig
[2004]. Building on Arrow [1971], they claim that ﬁnancial innovation can lead to greater risk
taking by ﬁrms, but also to fewer aggregate credit crunches. Their analysis implies that sectors
that beneﬁtm o r ef r o mﬁnancial innovation are going to experience larger declines in their correlation
with the rest of the economy because of the lower exposure to credit crunches and binding collateral
constraints (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1996]). Lower exposure to ﬁnancial stress will lead
to lower aggregate volatility. Comin and Philippon [2005] empirically explore this hypothesis by
including in regression (30) two additional controls that proxy for the degree of ﬁnancial dependence
in the sector: the amount of debt and equity issued in the sector, each divided by the total sales in the
sector. In contrast to R&D, both measures of ﬁnancial market dependence are positively associated
with the correlation of sectoral growth (although this relationship is statistically insigniﬁcant).
Therefore, improvements in ﬁnancial markets do not seem to be a major force decreasing aggregate
volatility. More importantly for our purposes, the negative eﬀect of R&D on the correlation of
sectoral growth is not driven by the omission of measures of external ﬁnancial dependence.
In summary, the existing theories proposed to explain the decline in aggregate volatility do not
seem to be driving the negative relationship between R&D and the correlation of sectoral growth.
This reinforces the view that, as suggested by our model, this relationship is causal.34
34Philippon [2003] argues that an increase in competition in the goods market leads ﬁrms to adjust their prices
faster, which reduces the impact of aggregate demand shocks. While intuitively appealing, Philippon [2003]’s is a
within-sector explanation with no implication for the evolution of sectoral co-movement.
273.5 Calibration
Section 3.3 showed econometric evidence in favor of the model’s mechanisms. In what follows, we
use a calibration to assess the model’s quantitative ability to generate the observed evolutions of
aggregate growth and volatility. One way of doing this would be to calibrate all the parameters
of the technology to develop general innovations and use them in the model along with the evolu-
tion of R&D-style innovations to pin down the evolution of λ
h. However, the lack of independent
information to calibrate ρh and ¯ λ
h makes this route unfeasible.
Alternatively, we assume that the post-war decline in the correlation of productivity growth
across sectors is driven by the decline in the development of general innovations. We then use this
information to pin down the evolution of λ
h and explore the model’s implications for the evolution
of productivity growth and aggregate volatility in 1950 and 2000.
Speciﬁcally, we use the following 6-step procedure:35
(i) Calibrate the initial turnover rate, λ
q
s1950, to match the initial correlation of rankings
in Figure 4. As shown in Appendix 3, this yields an estimate for λ
q
s1950 of two percent.
(ii) Using the value of λ
q
s1950 and the initial correlation and variance of sectoral growth










(iv) Calibrate the ﬁnal turnover rate, λ
q
s2000, to 2.5 times the initial turnover rate (i.e.
ﬁve percent).
(v) Using the ﬁnal correlation of sectoral growth (0.25) and the calibrated value of ln(δh),
compute the ﬁnal arrival rate for general innovations (λ
h
2000).
(vi) With this information and the number of sectors (35), compute the ﬁnal expected
growth rate of productivity, Eγy2000, and the initial and ﬁnal variance of aggregate
productivity growth (V γy1950,Vγy2000).
Table 3 shows the actual data, as well as the model’s predictions for the ﬁnal expected growth
rate of labor productivity and the initial and ﬁnal standard deviations of aggregate productivity
growth.
35A more detailed explanation of this calibration is presented in Appendix 3.
28Moment Data Model
Eγy2000 0.02 0.017
V γy1950 4*10-4 2.56*10-4
V γy2000 1.44*10-4 1.44*10-4
Increment in V γy -2.56*10-4 -1.12*10-4
Table 3
This simple calibration illustrates two things. First, the model can easily explain the lack of
a relation between R&D and productivity growth at the aggregate level. Despite the substantial
increase in R&D expenses, the model predicts a small decline in expected productivity growth for
the year 2000.36 Second, the mechanisms emphasized by the model can account for a signiﬁcant
fraction of the decline in aggregate volatility. The model underpredicts the initial level of aggregate
volatility; however, this is not surprising given that the only type of aggregate disturbances are
technology shocks, a scenario that is clearly unrealistic. The predicted decline in the variance of
aggregate productivity growth, however, represents over 40 percent of the observed decline in aggre-
gate volatility. This estimate must be taken with caution because of the identiﬁcation assumption
that the decline in the co-movement of sectoral growth is entirely driven by the decline in the de-
velopment of general innovations. However, this assumption may not be far from the truth, given
the important negative eﬀects of R&D on sectoral correlation that we estimated above. Moreover,
this rough estimate of the contribution of our endogenous technological change mechanisms to the
decline in aggregate volatility are consistent with Stock and Watson [2003]’s conclusion: after con-
sidering the eﬀects of a more active monetary policy and lower commodity price shocks, 50 percent
of the decline in aggregate volatility must be due to less volatile technology shocks.
4C o n c l u s i o n
A thorough understanding of the forces that drive growth in the US is an essential prerequisite for
undertaking informed policy recommendations. This paper has presented a new growth theory for
the US that is superior to current models because it overcomes two hurdles that we believe any valid
theory must overcome. First, it explains the relationship between R&D and productivity growth
36This calibration implies that about 90 percent of aggregate productivity growth was driven by general innovations
in 1950. This fraction declined to 67 percent by 2000.
29at the ﬁrm-level, as well as the lack of a relationship between the two at the sector and aggregate
level. Second, it explains the evolution of the second moments of productivity growth at the ﬁrm
and aggregate level. In particular, it explains the diverging trends in aggregate volatility and in the
volatility of publicly traded ﬁrms, and the fact that the decline in aggregate volatility is due to a
decline in the correlation of sectoral growth.
In addition to being consistent with these facts, this paper has also provided evidence on the
importance of the mechanisms emphasized by the model. In particular, it has showed that ﬁrm
volatility and market turnover are positively associated with R&D. Perhaps most importantly, it has
showed that sectors that have experienced higher increases in R&D have also experienced greater
declines in the correlation of their growth with the rest of the economy. This indicates that there is
a strong connection between aggregate and ﬁrm volatility. Furthermore, it supports the view that
this connection operates mainly through the eﬀect of R&D on the decline in the co-movement of
growth across sectors. By no means does this imply that all of the decline in aggregate volatility
(or increase in ﬁrm volatility) is driven by this common component associated with R&D; however,
it does show that this component is an important piece of the puzzle.
Finally, our model suggests that sectoral co-movement is driven by the development of general
innovations, and the decline of their importance in growth is at the root of the observed dynamics
for the ﬁrst and (to some extent) second moments of aggregate productivity growth. Since general
innovations are, by-and-large, not included in the NSF measure of R&D and since there is no
measure of the investments made to develop them or the number of general innovations developed,
we are unable to directly explore the determinants of general innovations. Instead, in this paper,
we have evaluated our theory of general innovations by exploring the validity of its implications for
the second moments of growth. In this way, studying the second moments of the growth process
can make up for the current lack of data on general innovations.
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34Appendix 1: Mathematical Details
First order conditions for the multisector case
In the symmetric equilibrium, the conditions that determine the investment in R&D and GIs by each type of
ﬁrm are the following:
1 − sR&D = ¯ λ(δ
1/N
q vl − vf) (LqM)
c0(λ
h/N)=( δh − 1)vl (LhM)
Proof that vf =0



















m¯ λ is equal to the cost of R&D investments for the follower.
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This equation implies that vf =0 .¤
Multisector
As in the one sector model, λ
h declines with ¯ λ and sR&D. To show this, we just have to combine equations (LqM)









Plugging in the functional form speciﬁed for c(.), results in the expression for the rate of arrival of general
innovations:
λ
h = N¯ λ
h
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Plugging back the expression for λ
h (34) into equation (LqM) and using expression (15) allows us to solve for
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Diﬀerentiating with respect to sR&D or ¯ λ it follows that λ
q













q −1)(N−1) > 0
Private R&D expenditures as a share of aggregate output, nq, is equal to
λq
s(1−sR&D)
¯ λ . Multiplying expression
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Using the expression for λ






q −1)(N−1) > 0.
Proposition 2 summarizes the conclusions from this analysis.
Proposition 2 In response to increases in sR&D and ¯ λ, the arrival rate of general innovations, λ
h declines; if
Condition 2 holds, the arrival rate of R&D innovations, λ
q
s, increases; if Condition 3 holds, the share of GDP spent
in private R&D, nq, increases.
36Appendix 2: Discussion of General Technologies
We present here several examples of inventions that meet the two criteria that characterize our
notion of general technologies. First, while these innovations originated in a particular context, the
general nature of the idea underlying them meant they were applied to many economic activities
across industries and sectors. Second, the disembodied nature of these innovations meant that they
could not be patented. As a result, ﬁrms could not appropriate the beneﬁt from these innovations
when competitors, whether within or across industries, adopted them. As the model predicts, in
many cases, these GIs were undertaken by the market leaders.
I. Production Design
A. Mass production of cars and Ford’s assembly line
Mass production ﬁr s to r i g i n a t e di nt h ea u t o m o b i l ei n d u stry in the United States in 1901. Amer-
ican car manufacturer Ransome Eli Olds (1864-1950) invented the basic concept of the assembly
line and mass produced the ﬁrst automobile, the Curved Dash Oldsmobile. Henry Ford (1863-1947)
invented an improved version of the assembly line by installing the ﬁrst conveyor belt-based assem-
bly line in his car factory in Ford’s Highland Park, Michigan plant, around 1913-14. The assembly
line reduced production costs for cars by reducing assembly time.
The philosophy of mass production was simple. Fixed overhead costs were spread out over
larger and larger volumes of production, thus lower and lower prices became possible. This strategy
that characterized mass production was to become the deﬁning characteristic of American industry
throughout the twentieth century. The Ford Motor Company was of course, at the time, one of the
top two car manufacturers in the country.
B. Scientiﬁc Management
Scientiﬁc management is the study of relationships between workers and machines. Frederick
Taylor, regarded as the Father of Scientiﬁc Management, published Principles of Scientiﬁc Manage-
ment in 1911, in which he proposed work methods designed to increase worker productivity. Taylor
realized that organization productivity could be increased by enhancing the eﬃciency of production
processes. This involved breaking down each task to its smallest unit and to ﬁgure out the one best
way to do each job. Emphasis was laid on ensuring the worker indulged in only those motions es-
sential to the task. Taylor looked at interaction of human characteristics, social environment, task,
and physical environment, capacity, speed, durability, and cost. The overall goal was to remove
human variability.
The results were profound. Productivity under Taylorism went up dramatically. In a famous
37experiment on the output of a worker loading pig iron to a rail car, Taylor increased the worker’s
output from 12 to 47 tons per day. New departments arose such as industrial engineering, personnel,
and quality control. There was also growth in middle management as there evolved a separation of
planning from operations. Rational rules replaced trial and error; management became formalized
and eﬃciency increased. This model, based on merit and unquestioned authority, was a dramatic
improvement over earlier models of organization.
C. Management Consulting
McKinsey and Co. was one of the ﬁrst management consulting ﬁrms established in 1923 in
Chicago. While the consulting industry had originated before then, the introduction of McKinsey’s
innovative approach to analyzing and solving problems constituted an important general technol-
ogy. The McKinsey way of consulting can be decomposed in the following three steps. First the
consultant gathers as much factual information about the client’s organization as possible. Second,
after a thorough analysis of the facts, an initial hypothesis is determined, to be tested with the
client. Finally, a set of recommendations are presented to the client. These recommendations are
limited to what can be realistically done given the resources of the client, the consulting ﬁrm and
the amount of time required. Further, the recommendations are proposed along with milestones to
be achieved as intermediate steps towards the ultimate target.
D. Multi-Divisional Structure
Faced by stiﬀ competition from Ford Motors, General Motors, at the time the leading car
manufacturer in the country, helped pioneer the Multi-divisional organizational structure in the
1920’s. The organization was divided into several divisions, each responsible for the production of
the car and its marketing to the assigned market segment. Each was to have its own managerial
team with complete autonomy over its operational decisions. The central oﬃce’s role would be
restricted to evaluate each divisions performance and coordinate overall strategy. The system helped
General Motors transition from a chaotic organization into a streamlined and eﬃcient competitor
in the automobile industry. As a result of the organizational change, GM’s market share grew
to 45 percent in 1940 from 11 percent in 1921. The multi-divisional structure has since become
a standard organizational feature of the corporate world, enabling many companies to eﬃciently
produce a wide array of products.
E. Just-in-Time Manufacturing
Toyota, the leading automobile manufacturer in Japan and one of the largest car manufacturers
in the world, introduced the ‘Just-in-Time’ system of manufacturing in the 1950’s. Elimination of
38the inventories meant that Toyota had to tighten coordination between successive stages of pro-
duction. The lack of inventories to buﬀer disruptions between adjacent stages of production meant
improvements in the reliability of every step of the process. The new system meant fewer interrup-
tions in the production process, faster identiﬁcation of ﬂaws in the cars and better communication
with suppliers. The success of its manufacturing system has helped it and other corporations achieve
world success in their respective industries.
II. Human Resources Management
A. The Hawthorne Studies
Beginning in 1924 and continuing until 1933, the Western Electric Company sponsored a series
of experiments for studying worker productivity and morale at its Hawthorne Works near Chicago.
As a market leader — the company was the manufacturing arm of AT&T, the leading long distance
provider for most of the 20th century — the company initiated these studies to determine the eﬀect
of working conditions on productivity.
The studies collectively highlighted the importance of positive worker attitude and provided
information about factors other than physical working conditions that contribute to productivity.
In particular, researchers found that a group norm regarding the rate of productivity signiﬁcantly
aﬀects individual performance, and that informal authority from inﬂuential group members often
overrode formal authority from the supervisor. A major outcome of the interviews was to teach
supervisors how to handle employee complaints. Smaller work groups and greater freedom were
found to be the greatest drivers of the observed increase in productivity. These ﬁndings on the
r e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e ni m p r o v e m e n t si np r o d u c t i v i t ya n db e t t e re m p l o y e em o r a l ew e r ea p p l i e dt oa
wide ranging group of employment settings.
B. Industrial Psychology
Industrial psychology involved the testing of morale and eﬃciency at businesses, industrial and
military organizations. Edwin A. Fleishman (1953) undertook what was a typical project of its time
at the International Harvester Company, one of the leading industrial corporations in the United
States. Fleishman studied the relationship of training programs on the leadership of supervisors
and their sensitivity to and consideration of the needs and feelings of subordinates. While super-
visors showed an initial response to the training program by being more considerate towards their
subordinates, in due course, they reverted back to their original behavior. The reversal of the be-
havior was attributed to the culture or climate of the department the subjects came from. In what
came to be known as a critical point in organizational change, the study highlighted the diﬀerence
39between focusing on the individual and focusing on contextual variables (such as group norms and
organizational culture).
C. Survey Feedback
The organizational survey feedback method ﬁrst showed up in the late 1940’s. Questionnaires
were being used to systematically assess employee morale and attitudes in organizations. Floyd
Mann’s study in 1957, guided by Rensis Likert, went a long way in developing what we now know
as the Survey Feedback method. The method involved data collection by questionnaire to determine
employee’s perceptions of the management of the organization. The second aspect of the method
was reporting the results back to the employees who answered the questionnaire. Once the results
of the survey had been conveyed, managers, using the help of the subordinates, would chart out
a plan to undertake positive changes in areas of concern as reﬂected in the survey results. The
study emphasized that the eﬀectiveness of the method relied on what the manager did with the
information from the survey. Positive changes occurred when the manager discussed the results
with his subordinates
D. Sensitivity Training
Sensitivity training refers to small group discussions where the primary, almost exclusive source
of learning is the behavior of the group members themselves. Participants receive feedback from one
another regarding their behavior in the group. Sensitivity training, also known as T-groups, became
the earliest tool of what came to be known as organizational development. Kurt Lewin discovered
the concept when undertaking a training workshop in Connecticut in 1946. He was asked to conduct
a workshop that would help improve community leadership in general and interracial relationships
in particular. Lewin brought in trainers and researchers and along with the participants engaged in
lectures, role play and general group discussions. In the evenings, the trainers and researchers would
evaluate the events of the day. The workshop acquired its signiﬁcance however when participants
happened to observe and participate in the evaluations as well. Participants began to object to the
interpretation of their behavior on several occasions. The observation by the participants resulted in
the three-way discussion among the researchers, trainers and participants. The participants in turn
became more sensitive to their own behavior in terms of how they were being perceived by others
and the impact their behavior was having on others. Carl Rogers labeled this mode of learning as
“perhaps the most signiﬁcant social invention of the century”.
III. Credit/banking
Improvements in the credit and banking sector have, both directly and indirectly, resulted in
40improvements in businesses across all sectors of the economy.
A. Credit card
The credit card industry began in the United States in the 1930s when oil companies and hotel
chains began issuing credit cards to customers for purchases made at their own gas stations and
hotels. The bank credit card was introduced in the 1950s. While store or book credit allowed
irregular repayment and installment loans required regular repayment, the credit cards of the early
1950s combined both types of credit. In 1951, Franklin National Bank released the ﬁrst revolving
charge card. At the time, it was one of the largest banks in the United States. Using the revolving
card a customer could borrow money, repay it and borrow again as long as the borrower remained
under their credit limit. The organizations that are now called Visa and MasterCard sprang up to
create interchange, a nation-wide system designed to settle credit card transactions between banks,
merchants and customers.
Today, with help from Visa and MasterCard, ﬁnancial institutions are marketing credit cards
to people all over the world. Credit cards have allowed consumers to carry debt, something that
previously required a bank loan — a much more intensive process than a credit-card approval. Credit
cards have been the primary instrument that fueled international consumerism and high consumer
debt, each of which has spurred multiple trickle-down industries.
B. Credit Reporting
In Manhattan during the 1830s, Lewis Tappan developed extensive credit records while handling
credit in his brother’s wholesale silk business. He then extended this aspect of the business to other
suppliers who needed information. He contracted with agents and correspondents throughout the
country to “gossip” about the solvency, prospects, and character of local businesses. He established
R. G. Dun & Co. (which later on merged with its biggest rival Bradstreet to form Dun & Bradstreet,
the largest credit reporting entity in the world), an information hub that could rapidly service new
inquiries and add new information and in the process helped found the business of credit reporting
in the United States. The credit reporting system and improvements in the same have helped
ﬁrms minimize risk. With access to the credit history of their customers, ﬁrms could target only
consumers meeting their criteria of their acceptable levels of risk. It has helped institutions reduce
bad debts and streamline their bottom lines.
C. ERMA and MRCI
During the 1950s, Bank of America, one of the largest banks in the nation at the time, ini-
tiated the Electronic Recording Method of Accounting computer processing system or ERMA, a
41project to computerize the banking industry. ERMA computerized the manual processing of checks
and account management and automatically updated and posted checking accounts. MICR, the
magnetic ink character recognition, was also part of ERMA. MICR allowed computers to read spe-
cial numbers at the bottom of checks that allowed computerized tracking and accounting of check
transactions. These inventions led to a more eﬃcient banking system.
D. Electronic money
The widespread use of electronic currency began with the automated clearinghouse (ACH), set
up by the US Federal Reserve in 1972 to provide the US Treasury and commercial banks with
an electronic alternative to check processing. Payments made today in nearly all of the deposit
currencies in the world’s banking systems are handled electronically through a series of inter-bank
computer networks.
Although banks have been able to move currency electronically for decades, only recently has
the average consumer had the capability to use electronic transfers in any meaningful way. The
increasing power and decreasing cost of computers – coupled with advancements in communication
technology that make global interaction available at vastly reduced costs – have together made the
digital transfer of funds a reality for millions of individuals around the world.
IV. Computer / Software / Internet
While innovations in this category clearly exhibit the characteristics of general technologies,
t h e ya r ei n c l u d e di nt h eN S F ’ sd e ﬁnition of Basic Research. In this sense, they are exceptions to
the rule: general technologies are not R&D.
A. Arpanet
Arpanet was created during the Cold War to meet the need for large powerful computers in the
country that were networked with each other to overcome geographic diﬀerences. Four computers
were the ﬁrst connected in the original ARPAnet. As the network expanded, diﬀerent models of
computers were connected, creating compatibility problems. The solution rested in a better set
of protocols called Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) designed in 1982.
To send a message on the network, a computer broke down its data into IP (Internet Protocol)
packets, like individually addressed digital envelopes. TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) ensured
the packets were delivered from client to server and reassembled in the right order. Several other
innovations occurred under ARPAnet - email (or electronic mail), the ability to send simple messages
to another person across the network (1971); telnet, a remote connection service for controlling a
computer (1972); and ﬁle transfer protocol (FTP), which allowed information to be sent from one
42computer to another in bulk (1973). Each of these inventions has made it signiﬁcantly easier for
businesses to communicate and share information both across and within each other.
B. Fortran
John Backus and a group started to design the FORmula TRANslator System, or FORTRAN
at IBM in 1954. IBM has of course been the leading computer technology corporation of the
20th century. Prior to the introduction of FORTRAN, computers were slow and unreliable and
all programming was done in machine or assembly code. The authors of FORTRAN claimed that
the resulting code would be as eﬃcient as handcrafted machine code. Work on FORTRAN was
completed in 1957 and for many years after, FORTRAN dominated programming, and was the
common tongue for computer programmers.
C. Computers
Conrad Zuse invented the ﬁrst freely programmable computer, the Z1 Computer, in 1936. How-
ever, the computers that are an integral part of all commercial activity today are the result numerous
related innovations since then. From the creation of the transistor in 1947, the ﬁrst commercial com-
puter in 1951 to the introduction of the integrated circuit in 1958 and the microprocessor in 1971,
several innovations have come together to integrate the use of computers in our lives. This general
technology has had an unparalleled impact on all commercial activity — from the organization of
businesses, to record keeping, to communication and the speedy automation of otherwise time con-
suming tedious tasks. Every business regardless of industry has adopted the use of computers in
order to improve production and increase eﬃciency.
D. Internet Search Engines
The ﬁrst Internet search engine, called ‘Archie’, was created in 1990 by Alan Emtage, a student
at McGill University. Since then numerous search engines have enabled people to search for and
gather information in a more inexpensive and convenient manner than ever before. Information is
used to produce virtually any good and service. Search engines increase the eﬃciency in the process
of gathering information. Thus, search engines increase productivity in a wide range of sectors.
Whether innovations in search engines are appropriable is more debatable. Clearly, they are not
embodied and non-patentable. However, the eﬀectiveness of the search engine and the advertising
revenues depend in part on the number of users. Since users may respond to innovations in the
search engine a part of the revenues created by these innovations will be appropriable. Having
said that, we still believe that, the lack of patents makes the concept of search engines a general
innovation.
43V. Trade
The introduction of malls and department stores constitute a general technology because im-
provements in the distribution of goods and services beneﬁted a variety of industries in the economy.
A. The Mall
The ﬁrst shopping mall was the Country Club Plaza, founded by the J.C. Nichols Company
and opened near Kansas City, MO, in 1922. J.C. Nichols Company was a prominent commercial
and residential real estate developer. The ﬁrst enclosed mall called Southdale opened in Edina,
Minnesota in 1956. In the 1980s, giant mega malls were developed. Mega malls revolutionized the
retail industry. The geographical concentration of hundreds of stores oﬀering goods and services
catering to every walk of life meant consumers could now indulge in a one-stop shopping experience.
Since their inception, mega malls have helped all retail outlets, independent of their industry, cater
to a much larger population of consumers.
B. Department Stores
In 1877, John Wanamaker opened ”The Grand Depot”, a six story round department store in
Philadelphia. He is credited with creating the ﬁrst White Sale, modern price tags, and the ﬁrst
in-store restaurant. He also pioneered the use of money-back guarantees and newspaper ads to
advertise his retail goods. Along with the retail giants of the day including, Marshall Field in
Chicago, Alexander T. Steward in New York, Wanamaker was one of the ﬁrst to discover the vast
power of buying wholesale and how it could cut costs to reduce retail prices.
C. Internet Shopping
Shopping on the internet has opened a new portal for doing business for virtually every type
of business in every industry. Every day, millions of dollars are transacted in exchange for every
imaginable product or service through the internet. The wide applicability of this invention is
evident. Similar to internet search engines, shopping on the internet is also not perfectly non-
appropriable. Speciﬁcw e b s i t e st h a tc r e a t eab r a n di m a g ei nc r e a t i n gam a r k e tf o rp u r c h a s ea n d
sale of goods and services (e.g. ebay, shopping.com) are able to extract a revenue stream from the
transactions. However, the concept of a website used to create a virtual marketplace for transactions




Coupons were ﬁrst introduced in 1895 by Asa Candler, owner of the Coca-Cola Company, one of
44the largest manufacturer, distributor and marketer of nonalcoholic beverages at the time in the US.
Candler placed coupons in newspaper for a free Coke from any fountain - to help promote the new
soft drink. Today coupons are an integral part of promotion campaigns for every business. Cut-out
coupons are included in newspapers as an advertising tool. They are also embedded in products
so as to encourage repeat purchases. Over the years, coupons have been adopted as marketing
tool across industries to help businesses build a brand image and target their customers in a more
eﬃcient manner.
B. Mail Order Catalog
Aaron Montgomery Ward invented the idea of a mail order catalog. As a traveling salesman, he
realized that his rural customers could be better served by mail-order, a revolutionary idea at the
time. The ﬁrst catalog consisted of a single sheet of paper with a price list, 8 by 12 inches, showing
the merchandise for sale with ordering instructions. Today, mail-order catalogs are an integral part
of major retail businesses. They have helped businesses across sectors to tap into the market of
consumers who are unwilling or unable to access the retail outlets. Serving as an eﬀective marketing
medium, mail order catalogs have opened up new segments of consumers previously unavailable to
these businesses.
VII. Chemical Engineering
Arthur D. Little, Inc., one of the ﬁrst consulting ﬁrms founded in 1886 that became a pioneer and
industry leader in the chemical consulting industry, introduced the concept of the ‘unit operations’ in
1915. It referred to activities such as mixing, heating, ﬁltering, verizing among others that featured
in any chemical process. Chemical engineering research was directed towards the improvement of
such processes. The concept of unit operations was instrumental to the success of Pre-production
Planning. Pre-production made possible the transition from the conﬁnes of the laboratory to large
scale production and was critical to the development of chemical engineering. In its stages of infancy,
chemical engineering research was applied to the paper and pulp industry and contributed to the
at the time new sulﬁte process of converting wood pulp into paper. In more recent times, advances
in the ﬁeld have had a substantial impact across several sectors, perhaps most noticeably on the
petrochemical industry.
45Appendix 3: Discussion of Calibration
In this appendix, we discuss in greater detail the calibration conducted in section 3.5 to explore
the model predictions for aggregate volatility and growth. In particular, we explain each of the 6
steps.




2000) to match the initial corre-
lation of rankings in ﬁgure 4.
We proceed in two steps. First, we use the model to compute the productivity percentiles of the
leader and the followers in a sector. Second, we use the model to compute the expected correlation
o ft h ep e r c e n t i l e so v e rt i m ea saf u n c t i o no fλ
q
s.
At any given moment in time, the market leader has higher productivity than the m followers.
These in turn have the same level of sales per worker. The percentile of the leader pl =1 /(2(m+1)),
while the percentile of the followers pf =( m +2 ) /(2(m +1 ) ) . Let’s denote by − → pt the (m +1 )x 1
vector that contains the percentile of each ﬁrm at year t. The mean and variance of − → pt are constant
and given by μp =0 .5 and Va r p = m/(2(m +1 ) ) 2, respectively.
The correlation of percentiles between years t and t +1is given by the following expression:
Corr(− → pt,− − → pt+1)=










where E denotes the expectation of − − → pt+1 conditional on − → pt.
With probability 1−λ
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i=1 (pit−μp)2/(m+1) = Va r p. With probability
λ
q
s, one ﬁrm will take over the market leader and they will swap their percentiles at year t+1.F o r
the market leader, (pit − μp)=−m/(2(m +1 ) ) , while for the followers, (pit − μp)=1 /(2(m +1 ) ) .
Hence,
Cov(− → pt,− − → pt+1)=( 1 − λ
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where the last approximation holds when m is suﬃciently large. Substituting into (37), it follows
that
Corr(− → pt,− − → pt+1) ' (1 − λ
q
s)
46It also follows that for small λ
q
s,
Corr(− → pt,− − → pt+5) ' (1 − 5λ
q
s).
Since in 1950 Corr(− → pt,− − → pt+5) ' 0.9, we calibrate λ
q
s1950 to 0.02. Similarly, since in 2000 Corr(− → pt,− − → pt+5) ∈
(0.7,0.75), we calibrate λ
q
s2000 to (0.05, 0.06).
(ii) Using the value of λ
q
s1950 and the initial correlation and variance of sectoral
growth, pin down the values for λ
h




q ))2 and ln(δ
1/N
q ).
In the multisector version of the model, we have seen that the variance of sectoral growth and
the correlation of sectoral growth are given by the following expressions:





























It also follows from (38) and (39) that λ










We calibrate corr(γys,γys0)1950 to 0.5 (ﬁgure 7) and Vγys(1950) to 0.0005 both computed using









q ), which is assumed to be constant.
(iii) Using the average initial growth rate of productivity, calibrate ln(δh) and λ
h
1950.

















47Further, once ln(δh) is known, λ
h = λ
h(ln(4h))2/ (ln(δh))2. We use BLS data reported in ﬁgure 1
to calibrate Eγy1950 to 0.025 and then use expression (41) to pin down ln(δh) and λ
h
1950.
(v) Using the ﬁnal correlation of sectoral growth and the calibrated value of ln(δh),
compute the ﬁnal rate of arrival of general innovations (λ
h
2000).









Substituting in (i) Φ2000 ,w h i c hw es e tt o0 . 2 5b a s e do nﬁgure 7, (ii) λ
q
s2000,which we have set to
0.05 based on the discussion above and (iii) the calibrated values of ln(δ
1/N




(vi) With this information and the number of sectors (35), compute the ﬁnal ex-
pected growth rate of productivity (Eγy2000), the initial and ﬁnal variance of aggregate
productivity growth (V γy1950,Vγy2000).









































Smoothed Productivity Growth (Left Axis) Private R&D/GDP (Right Axis)
Figure 1: Evolution of (Smoothed) Productivity Growth and Private R&D share in GDP. Note: Pro-
ductivity growth series obtained from the BLS. The productivity growth series has been smoothed
with a Band-Pass ﬁlter that keeps ﬂuctuations associated with cycles of period greater than 30























































Aggregate Productivity Growth (Left Axis) Firm-level Productivity Growth (Right Axis)
Figure 2: Evolution of the Aggregate and Firm-level Volatility of productivity. Note: Aggregate
productivity growth comes from the BLS. Firm-level sales per worker obatined from COMPUSTAT.


























sales sales per worker
Figure 3: Firm-level Volatility of Sales and Productivity after controlling for compositional change.
Note: Ploted series are the coeﬃcients of year dummies in a volatility regression after controlling
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New Jorgenson Dataset Old Jorgenson Dataset
Figure 5: Evolution of Sectoral Correlation of Productivity Growth. Note: Data source Jorgenson







1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989
New Jorgenson Dataset Old Jorgenson Dataset
Figure 6: Correlation of Sectoral TFP Growth. Note: Data source is KLEM Jorgenson and Stiroh
data set.
51Table 1
Examples of General Innovations
Innovation Date Importance Market Leader
Management and Production Design
Mass Production 1900 Fixed costs spread out over larger volumes meant lower costs. Yes
Ford Assembly Line 1913 Shorter assembly time resulted in lower production costs. Yes
Scientific Management  1911 Used a scientific approach to production processes to 
improve productivity.
McKinsey Management Consulting 1923 Introduced a streamlined approach to consulting services.   
Multi-Divisional Structure 1920's Introduced the idea of autonomous divisions responsible for 
pursuing goals, independent of each other.
Yes




Hawthorne Studies 1924-1933 Highlighted the importance of the relationship between the 
employee morale and productivity.
Yes
Industrial Psychology 1940's-50's Emphasized contextual variables for purposes of training and 
positive organization change.
Yes
Survey Feedback 1940's Highlighted the importance of sharing feedback with 
employees.
Sensitivity Training 1946 Focused on the importance of open discussion in small 
groups. 
Credit/Banking
Credit card 1950 Helped businesses and consumers undertake credit 
transactions in a more extensive and systematic manner. 
Yes
Electronic Recording Method of Accounting 1950's Helped computerize the banking industry. Yes
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition 1950's Allowed computerized tracking and accounting of check 
transactions.
Yes
Electronic Money 1972 Introduced an electronic alternative to check processing. Yes
Computer / Software / Internet
Hypertext 1945 Basis of the eventual World Wide Web.
Arpanet 1969 Enabled the exchange of information over large geographic 
distances.
Fortran 1957 High-level programming language that made for improved 
scientific, engineering and mathematical applications. 
Yes
Computers 1936 Enabled the automation of an assortment of functions.
Internet Search Engines 1990 Greatly reduced cost and increased convenience of gathering 
of information.
Internet Shopping 1990's Provided firms with a new avenue to conduct their business.
Trade
Mall 1922 Started the modern-day one-stop shop for all consumers. Yes
Department Store 1877 Improved the efficiency of retail and distribution.
Marketing
Coupons 1895 Effective promotion/marketing tool.  Yes
Mail order catalog 1872 Enabled businesses to target consumers that did not access to 
retail outlets.
Chemical Engineering
Chemical Engineering 1920's Improved the design and control of similar operations at 
plants in several different industries. 
YesTable 2: R&D, Firm-level Volatility and Sectoral Co-movement
R&D -3.28 -3.11 -3.39 -2.49 -3.11 -3.1
(1.42) (1.44) (1.45) (1.09) (1.06) (1.07)
Firm level volatility -0.297 -0.287 -0.27 -0.237 -0.239 -0.25
(0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.083) (0.084) (0.085)
Energy share -0.49 -0.35 -0.077 0.076 -0.057 0.065 -0.18 -0.038
(0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.19) (0.18) (0.24) (0.22)
N 1011 1011 1011 1011 982 982 1011 1011 1011 1011 982 982
Sectors All All All All All All All All
Notes:
Newey-West standard errors are reflected in parentheses.
Firm volatility is measured by the sectoral average of the firm-level variance of the growth rate of sales.
All regressions include sector and year fixed effects.
Dependent variable
correlation in sectoral productivity growth correlation in sectoral TFP growth
Non-energy Non-energy